Deconstructing the Ethical Turn of Metaphysics: Derrida on the Responsibility of the Other and Death

Abstract

This paper examines Jacques Derridas deconstruction of the ethical turn in metaphysics, focusing on his reinterpretation of responsibility toward the Other and the ontological significance of death. By critiquing Heideggers ontological difference and the metaphysical
privileging of presence, Derrida introduces diffance as the non-subjective origin of meaning, destabilizing traditional notions of subjectivity. Through analyses of Abrahams sacrifice of Isaac and Lacans interpretation of The Purloined Letter, Derrida redefines responsibility as
an asymmetrical, infinite obligation to the absolutely Other, mediated by deaths unrepresentable absence. The paper further explores how
rationalitys exclusion of madness (via Foucault) and the deferral inherent in diffance expose the aporias of logocentrism, arguing that ethics
emerges from an economy of non-utilitarian gifts and irreducible alterity. Ultimately, Derridas thought reconfigures subjectivity as a fractured, historically contingent process, entangled with the Others unanswerable call.