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The Impact Mechanism and Practical Implications of Media Attention on Corporate Performance

Yuchen Chen

Abstract


Against the backdrop of deepened capital market reforms and diversified media forms, media attention has emerged as a critical
external factor influencing corporate performance. Based on agency theory, information asymmetry theory, and reputation theory, this study
systematically analyzes the core mechanisms through which media attention affects corporate performance, explores the moderating roles of
contextual factors such as industry characteristics, audit quality, and regional differences, and reveals differentiated impact paths through typical cases. The findings indicate that media attention acts on corporate performance through three key mechanismsinformation transmission,
governance supervision, and resource mobilizationwith its effects constrained by firms' governance foundations and institutional environments. This study provides theoretical references and practical guidance for enterprises to optimize media relationship management and for
regulatory authorities to improve information disclosure systems.

Keywords


Media attention; Corporate performance; Corporate governance; Impact mechanism; Contextual factors

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/memf.v3i1.8472

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