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Rule Design and Efficiency Analysis in Digital Transaction Order: A Law and Economics Perspective

Peng Zhao

Abstract


This article examines how rule design affects transaction efficiency in digital transaction order from the perspective of law and economics. Rather than treating digital trade environments as neutral technical spaces, the paper argues that they are structured by institutional
choices concerning access, information disclosure, ranking, reputation, and dispute handling. These choices determine the level of search
costs, verification costs, opportunism risks, and enforcement frictions faced by transacting parties. Building on Coasean and transaction-cost
approaches, the paper explains why digital environments do not eliminate frictions but instead transform them into new forms that require
carefully calibrated rule arrangements.

Keywords


Digital transaction order; Law and economics; Rule design; Transaction costs; Platform governance; Reputation systems; Efficiency analysis

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/memf.v3i7.9490

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