A Study on Managerial Power Allocation and Corporate Innovation Performance from the Perspective of Company Law
Abstract
through structural power, ownership power, expert power, and prestige power. Corporate innovation performance is measured by R&D
intensity, patent applications, invention patents, and patent citation quality. The paper further introduces board independence, ownership
concentration, financing constraints, and legal compliance intensity as moderating variables. The expected finding is an inverted U-shaped
relationship: moderate managerial power improves innovation performance by accelerating decision-making and protecting long-term R&D
projects, whereas excessive managerial power reduces innovation efficiency by weakening board monitoring, increasing private benefits, and
encouraging symbolic innovation. The contribution of this paper lies in connecting corporate governance theory with company law. It argues
that the legal design of managerial power should not simply pursue either empowerment or restriction. A more effective legal structure should
combine managerial autonomy, accountable board supervision, transparent disclosure, and innovation-oriented fiduciary interpretation. This
approach helps explain why similar levels of managerial power may produce different innovation outcomes under different legal and governance environments.
Keywords
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/memf.v3i9.9877
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