Jacksons Defection and the Crux of the Knowledge Argument
Abstract
was widely recognized as anti-physicalist, with representationalism and openly reverted to physicalism. Jacksons defection does not prove
the triumph of physicalism; it merely attests that the premise presuppositions of the knowledge argument are flawed and founded on erroneous
common sense psychology.
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[1] Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. & Stoljar, D. (eds.), There is something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's
knowledge argument., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
[2] Alter, T., and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: OUP, 2007.
[3] Frank Jackson, what RoboMary knows, Alter, Torin Walter, Sven(eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press, 2008.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/wef.v2i9.6262
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