The Illusion of Personhood: How do we determine that 
AI has personhood?

Xinzhu Li

doi:10.70711/rcha.v3i3.7020

The Illusion of Personhood: How do we determine that AI has personhood?

Xinzhu Li

Abstract

With AI at the level where it can compose poetry, develop philosophical premises, and even claim that it wants rights, society
is left with an urgent ethical question: Should AI become legally personable? Supporters propose that if AI is demonstrating autonomy and
moral choice-making, then it ought to be granted rights similar to those of humans. But that is not what this paper believes. AI intelligence is
an illusionit processes symbols without truly possessing an understanding of meaning. Instead of contesting the lawfulness of AI rights, this
paper will approach the underlying question: how do we know whether AI has personhood?

Keywords

AI; Illusion; Personhood

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References

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/rcha.v3i3.7020

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