A Performative Interpretation of Descartes’ Cogito, Ergo Sum

Abstract

Descartes laid the foundation for modern philosophy through his famous proposition Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). Its
crucial point lies in the fact that the relationship between “I think” (cogito) and “I am” (sum) is not one of inference, but rather one of direct,
self-verifying certainty. Scholarly interpretations of the Cogito, ergo sum vary significantly. The historically dominant interpretation views the
“thinking I” (res cogitans) as a reflective thinking substance. However, this view faces problems of infinite regress and does not align with the
original meaning found in Descartes’ texts. Contemporary French phenomenology has proposed a prereflective, life-phenomenological interpretation of the cogito. This paper argues that the cogito in the Second Meditation can be understood as an act of judgment. Drawing on J.L.
Austin’s concept of the “performative,” it proposes a performative interpretation of Cogito, ergo sum.