The Transcendental Leap for Evidence: Driving Forces and Core Paths of the Transformation of Husserl's Intentionality Theory from Logical Investigations to Ideas I
Abstract
theoretical dilemmas and deepens his philosophical pursuit. Logical Investigations laid phenomenology's descriptive foundation via the "intentional act-meaning-object" structure but faced conceptual ambiguity, methodological incompleteness, ontological ambiguity, and limited
consciousness analysisfailing to achieve "absolute knowledge evidence." Ideas I resolved these issues through transcendental reduction,
the Noesis-Noema structure, expanded potential intentionality, and transcendental idealism, completing the leap from "descriptive psychology" to
"transcendental phenomenology." This paper focuses on the transformation's problem consciousness and solution paths, revealing its internal logic.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/rcha.v3i12.8615
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