The Irreducibility of the Indexical "I": A Study Centered on Williams' Critique of Lichtenberg
Abstract
of being erased due to their lack of a fixed referent or ambiguous reference, I argue that indexicals possess a necessary reason for existence.
Therefore, this paper aims to focus on the irreducibility of the indexical "I." This paper will analyze the metaphysical implications of "I" by
examining Bernard Williams' critique of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's "impersona" version of "I think" (the original being Descartes' "I
think") to analyze the metaphysical implications of "I, " revealing that "I" as a referential anchor is an objective logical necessity, and thereby
providing a metaphysical foundation for the irreducibility of the indexical "I."
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.70711/rcha.v4i4.9573
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